Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice By David Galula Summary written by Brett Reeder, Conflict Research Consortium Citation: Galula, . WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport. operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and. Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN.
|Published (Last):||17 March 2004|
|PDF File Size:||16.65 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||13.28 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. While counterinsurgents are powerful, they are obliged to uphold law and order, which limits their potential action.
Further, the counterinsurgency must learn and adapt as it goes along.
Tactics Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics. While insurgencies often fail on their own accord, “Relying on luck Having attained the support of the population it is imperative to remember that this support is conditional. A successful insurgency requires a viable cause to rally support. Guidelines for Using Beyond Intractability resources. Keeping this emphasis on political action and the laws of counterinsurgency in mind, Galula develops a comprehensive strategy for dealing effectively with hot insurgencies.
Retrieved from ” https: Tell us about your work. Galula’s wife recalled that her husband went to China to follow Guillermaz, who was, “without a doubt, the most influential person in David’s life.
Galula’s work on counter-insurgency is in large part based on the experiences and lesson of years of French colonial warfare, most notably the work of Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it.
Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. Thus, according to the laws of counterinsurgency, it is important counterinsurgejcy continuously make efforts at gaining and maintaining the support of the populace in distinct areas by leveraging an active minority. What you do counteerinsurgency, and support can be lost if your actions are unfavorable to the population.
However, he cautions that the lessons of this book do not guarantee success and that, “As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a warfarr form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists” p The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the gzlula.
At the heart of this political machine is the development of a counterinsurgent cause to compete with the insurgent cause.
David Galula – Wikipedia
Though potentially quite effective, such action can backfire and anger the galjla population. Such direct action should only be attempted when the insurgent’s cause in not popular, the counterinsurgent has the legal authority to act, and significant publicity of such action can be prevented.
The final option, strengthening or building the “political machine” of the state, consists of convincing the population to buy into the state’s legitimacy and moral authority. In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgency because the “moral fog” surrounding the insurgents dissipates and the counterinsurgency is free to act more decisively.
Check out our Quick Start Guide. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
He distinguished himself by applying personal tactics in counterinsurgency to his sector of Kabylieat Djebel Mimoun,  near Tigzirteffectively eliminating the nationalist insurgency in his sector and earning accelerated promotion from this point. Galula’s laws thus take at face value and recognize the importance of the aphorism, based on the ideas of Mao, that “The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims.
Praeger Security International, Such programs are often based on reason, and will be relatively ineffective in the early stages of an insurgency when “passion is the prime mover,” but as the conflict progresses and the pragmatic implications of the war become the “the prime mover,” rational programs which improve the lives of the populace will become highly persuasive.
Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts counterinsurgencyy rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority. Each of the steps is to be undertaken in a specific area consistent with the fourth law and then repeated in other areas as necessary. He died in of lung cancer. Please Support Our Fundraising Drive.
Counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate power. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support of the active leaders. They can act directly on the insurgent leaders, they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency, they can infiltrate the insurgent movement, or they can reinforce their own “Political Machine”.
Glaula many of its empirical examples are dated, its insights remain hauntingly relevant.
This “compass” is comprised of the laws and principals of counterinsurgency warfare, and corresponding strategy and tactics. After living as a civilian in North Africahe joined the I Corps of the Army of the Liberation, and served during the liberation of Francereceiving a wound during the invasion of Elba in June That is, the response necessary to eliminate the insurgency is likely to be seen as excessive by the general population.
The infiltration of an insurgency seeks to destroy it from within by turning it against itself. In this book, Galula provides the basic strategy and tactics necessary to successfully defeat insurgencies through the development of a “political machine” capable of garnering public support. The first law is that the population is paramount. This ensures that soldiers do not have to constantly relearn the cultural nuances of a local area.