Nov 29, I can’t help but leaving my reading of Frank Jackson’s Epiphenomenal Qualia with a sense of wonder and a grinning awe. This, independent of. Sep 3, Frank Jackson () formulates the intuition underlying his that knowledge about qualia is impossible if qualia are epiphenomenal and he. Oct 2, Jackson quotes are from “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Jackson describes himself as “a qualia freak”. The word “qualia” is the plural of the word.

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Knowledge argument

Science Logic and Mathematics. According to the view proposed by Conee the physicalist can defend himself against the knowledge argument in the following way: But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changed into a eppihenomenal perceiver by some medical procedure. This is more consilient with neuroscience’s understanding of color vision.


Mistakes About the Meaning of Life. It has been argued by several authors that the different modes of presentation at issue in the case of beliefs about phenomenal states do involve the introduction of different reference-fixing properties and that therefore the proposal is unsuccessful.

Even with the entire physical database at one’s fingertips, humans would not be able to fully perceive or understand a bat’s sonar system, namely what it is like to perceive something with a bat’s sonar.

But she had all the physical information. More recently Michael Tye defends the acquaintance hypothesis as the right answer to the knowledge argument thereby abondoning his original response see below 4. Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition 2.

Jackson seems to find the modal argument against physicalism less persuasive than the knowledge frannk 1. The appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remains controversial. White argues against Loar that the account cannot explain the a posteriori character of mind-brain identity frak in a satisfying manner. The Ability hypothesis implies that there is some knowledge that can only be acquired by having experiences of a particular kind and that this knowledge is nothing but knowing-how.


Jackson contends that, yes, she has learned something new, qualiaa experience, and hence, physicalism is false.

Once these two steps are clearly distinguished one may conclude that Marianna’s relevant epistemic progress at t 3 and Mary’s relevant progress after release is not happily described by talk of knowing what it’s like. The experiment is intended to argue against physicalism —the view that the universe, including all that is mental, is entirely physical.

Jackson has us imagine this person Fred who is able to discriminate two different colors of perfectly ripe tomatoes, which he calls red 1 and red 2 1.

Ramachandran and Hubbard’s contribution is in terms of exploring “the neural basis of qualia” by “using pre-existing, stable differences in the conscious experiences of people who experience synaesthesia compared with those who do not” but, jacckson note that “this still doesn’t explain why these particular events are qualia laden and others are not Chalmers’ ‘hard problem’ but at least it narrows the scope of the problem” p.

Despite a lack of dualist responses overall and Jackson’s own change of view, there are more recent instances of prominent dualists defending the Knowledge Argument. With a richer grasp of the world and a larger science, we can see where the tough-minded slugists go wrong.

Some have argued that the phenomenal conceptualization is not expressible in language see Byrne and Hellie Given jacskon cognitive independence of physical and phenomenal concepts of blueness it appears as if we could imagine a situation where everything Mary knew before release were fulfilled but not what she came to know after release and this can be taken to imply that she does come to know new facts.


And then I decided that the best way out is to think in representationalist terms about phenomenal experience.

Only at t 3when Marianna is finally released and sees the sky, does she gain this item of knowledge. But then these three kinds of abilities cannot conjointly amount to knowing what it is like either: So the epiphenomenal stuff was just very hard to believe.

Frank Jackson, Latter Day Physicalist – The Philosophers’ Magazine

Philosophy of mind series. Many take it to be obvious that a person cannot know that she now has a blue experience unless her blue experience plays a prominent causal role in the formation of her belief at issue.

It is therefore safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not come to an end in the near future. There are two possible strategies for a dualist to take who wishes to defend the knowledge argument.

The Modal Argument Journal of Consciousness Studies. We believe we’ve learned the answer from a colorblind synesthete subject.

BroadHerbert Feigland Thomas Nagelover a fifty-year span, presented insight to the subject, which led to Jackson’s proposed thought experiment. I wrote it reasonably epiphenomeal. One might think that his view is incompatible with the intuition at issue.