In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.
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University of Michigan Press. Added to PP index Total downloads 5of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 1of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Phlogiston, Lavoisier and the Purloined Referent.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The reference or “referent”; Bedeutung of a proper name is the object it means or indicates bedeutenits sense Sinn is what the name expresses. A Note on Frege on Sense. Index of language articles.
Sense and reference – Wikipedia
Trust me on this. He then concludes that the thought must instead be the nominqtum sense and goes on to argue that the reference of a sentence is just its truth-value. But his underlying thought seems to be that the claim that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous” have the same denotation is a claim about linguistic practicewhereas “Hesperus is Phosphorous” was meant to be a claim about celestial bodies. What is Frege’s argument that the thought “contained” in a sentence cannot be its reference?
And in this usage, it means something more like “semantic value”. Frege’s notion of sense is somewhat obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role.
Sense and reference
The thought remains the same whether or not ‘Odysseus’ has a reference. Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” German: Find it on Scholar.
This criterion is linked to a Learning Outcome Description of criterion. The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like ‘planet’ has no such direct relation at all to the Earth at all, but only to a concept that the Earth falls under. What assumptions about sense and cognitive value must such an explanation make?
What is Noominatum argument that senses are not “ideas”?
Bell’, Analysis 40 pp. There is a major issue about how one of Frege’s key terms is to be translated. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have i. Descriptions such as ‘the President of the U. Michael De Medeiros – – Weigl Publishers.
Moreover, ‘meaning’ captures Frege’s early use of Bedeutung well, [20] and it would be problematic to translate Frege’s early use as ‘meaning’ and his later use as ‘reference’, suggesting a change in terminology not evident in the original German.
Grege, when one uses a name, one uses it to talk about its reference. Pylyshyn – – Cognition 9 2: Frege then says that each name has a “sense” that “contains” a “mode of presentation” that is associated with that name, but most commentators have simply supposed that the sense is the mode of presentation. Much of analytic philosophy is traceable sene Frege’s philosophy of language.
What does the way Frege argues here tell us about how he is thinking about ‘sense’? The central purpose of this paper is to establish a distinction between the reference of an expression—primarily, a proper name—and sdnse Frege calls its sense.
Here senss looks as if what one is saying Lois believes is determined by the sense of the name “Superman”, since Lois does believe that Superman can fly, but not that Clark can. Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear. How, as it is put, can the one have a different “cognitive value” from the other?
This entry has no external links. In the next few in pp. Frege says first that “Such a sentence contains a thought”, by which he means a certain “objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers”.
The Varieties of Andd.
Over the next several pargaraphs pp. Frege then turns to the question what we should regard as the sense and niminatum, not of a name, but of a whole declarative sentence. On Sense, Reference, and Tone in History. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. See also Bell, D. For our purposes, we need not consider the details of this argument, but my own view, for what it is worth, is that Frege’s reasons are ultimately logical in character: For example, Mont Blanc, ‘with its snowfields’, cannot be a component of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4, metres high.
But then how can the former be nomonatum and the latter a mere instance of the law of self-identity? As it happens, this is true: Michelle Montague – – Philosophical Studies 2: The reference of frsge sentence is its truth valueits sense is the thought that it expresses.
Some Reflections on Gibson’s ‘Ecological Approach’.
The problem, however, is that if identity is a relation between objects, then it looks as if “Hesperus is Phosophorous” and “Hesperus is Hesperus” assert that exactly the same relation obtainsnamely, a relation between Venus and itself.