SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.
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It’s got speculators searching for quick gains in hot housing markets; it’s got loans that seem to have been made with little or no serious analysis by lenders; and finally, it’s got Wall Street, which churned out mortgage “product” because buyers wanted it. Next Pass Through Rate. Read the page prospectus, related documents, and other public records with a jaundiced eye and try to see how things can go wrong.
Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk (Fortune, ) | Fortune
Weighted Average Max Rate Original. Similarly, Wall Street carves mortgages into tranches because it can get more for the pieces than it would get for whole mortgages.
Tyson can slice a chicken into breasts, legs, thighs, giblets—and Lord knows what else—and get more for the pieces than it gets for a whole chicken.
These loans, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of Customers are happy, because they get only the pieces they want. Weighted Average Months to Maturity Prior.
Pmnts, 9 Month Prior. 2006-z3 spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by borrowers. That, of course, is what nearly everyone does.
It’s all in the math – and the assumptions about how borrowers will behave. It was go-go finance, very 21st century. Realized Loss Detail Report. After paying the people who collected the payments and handled all the other paperwork, the GSAMP Trust had ten percentage points left. More than a third of the loans were in California, then a trusy market.
GSAMP Trust 2006-S3
Of course, Goldman knew a lot about this market: It’s just truat big to be understandable. Interest rates on mortgages stopped falling. Someone wants a safe, relatively low-interest, short-term security?
As long as housing prices kept rising, it all looked copacetic. And no one knows whether borrowers’ incomes or assets bore any serious relationship to what they told the mortgage lenders. That spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by gsa,p. This issue, which is backed by ultra-risky second-mortgage loans, contains all the elements that facilitated the housing bubble and bust.
There are two options. How does toxic waste get distilled into spring 20006-s3 Basis Risk CarryFwd Paid. Pmnts, 11 Month Prior. To transform them into securities trus could sell to investors, it divided them into tranches – which is French for “slices,” in case you’re interested. A version of this article was originally published in the October 29, issue of Fortune.
Junk mortgages under the microscope – Oct. 16,
Goldman may have had money at risk in some of the other tranches, but there’s no way to know without Goldman’s cooperation, which wasn’t forthcoming. Someone wants a risky piece with a potentially very rich yield, an indefinite maturity, and no credit rating at all?
Interest rates on mortgages stopped falling. One Goldman filing lists more tdust 1, pages of individual loans – but they’re by code number and zip code, not name and address. Weighted Average Months to Maturity Current.
Goldman said it made money in the third quarter by shorting an index of mortgage-backed securities.
Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk
It gets first dibs on trusst paydowns from regular monthly payments, refinancings, and borrowers paying off their loans because they’re selling their homes. Even Goldman may have lost money on GSAMP – but being Goldman, the firm has more than covered its losses by betting successfully that the price of junk mortgages would drop.
Goldman said it made money in the third quarter by shorting an index of mortgage-backed securities.